The Dark side of natural resources
Maybe you could be interested in this section I found in Global Policy web page. It is clear and well structured. Let's talk about 'power'!
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/docs/minindx.htm
N Korea's missiles met by Japanese sanctions
By Hisane Masaki TOKYO -
Just hours after North Korea's provocative series of missile launches, Japan has reacted by banning the docking of the Mangyongbyon-92, a ferry that shuttles between Wonson in North Korea and Niigata, and which is the main direct link between the two countries. As of Wednesday morning, the ship was anchored in the Sea of Japan about two kilometers off Niigata prefecture. Also on Wednesday morning, the United Nations Security Council held an emergency, closed meeting to discuss the issue, after a request to do so by Japan's ambassador to the UN, Kenzo Oshima. The request followed an emergency meeting of Japan's national security council, convened by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Additional Japanese sanctions are in the pipeline. Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe said "Japan will take any kind of sanctions we can" against North Korea, including economic and financial sanctions. Japan also plans to bring up the issue at the Group of Eight (G8) summit to be held in St Petersburg later this month, Abe said. North Korea staged a series of missile tests in the early hours of July 5, which was still July 4, Independence Day, in the US. One of the missiles launched was the Taepodong-2 long-range missile, which some claim can hit the western extremities of the US. It fizzled out, crashing into the Sea of Japan less than a minute after launch. The other half dozen launches were various versions of shorter-range Scuds and Rodong missiles, some of which have a range sufficient to reach virtually any target in either South Korea or Japan. They all fell harmlessly in the Sea of Japan (which Koreans call the East Sea). "North Korea has gone ahead with the launch despite international protests," Abe said. "That is regrettable from the standpoint of Japan's security, the stability of international society, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This is a grave problem in terms of peace and stability not only of Japan but also of international society. We strongly protest against North Korea." Meanwhile, Japan's Foreign Minister Taro Aso was consulting by telephone with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. The two agreed that the UN Security Council should take up the issue. Washington denounced the launches as a "provocation" soon after they were confirmed. "You're going to see a lot of diplomatic activity here in the next 24-48 hours, said National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley. US anti-missile systems based in Alaska, California and at sea were on alert but not activated. Japan and the US had warned in recent weeks that a Taepodong-2 launch would violate Pyongyang's self-imposed 1999 moratorium on ballistic missile tests, a 2002 agreement with Japan, and also its implicit agreement in the six-party nuclear talks last year. Pyongyang had claimed, however, that its moratorium on ballistic missile tests no longer applied as it was no longer in direct talks with Washington. While stepping up diplomatic efforts to rally international pressure on Pyongyang to halt its preparations, Japan had threatened to impose economic sanctions in close cooperation with the US if the Taepodong-2 was launched, with or without a sanctions resolution of the United Nations Security Council. Even before Wednesday's missile tests, Japan and the US reportedly had already begun discussions on a prospective Security Council resolution harshly condemning such action. Foreign Minister Aso said recently that it would be "inevitable" for the Security Council to consider imposing sanctions on Pyongyang if a launch went ahead. But it remains to be seen how much support Japan and the US can garner. When Pyongyang test-launched a Taepodong-1 missile over Japan's air space in 1998, the Security Council only issued a statement to the press - not a binding resolution or even a chair's statement - expressing concerns. That was because China objected to discussing the matter in the Security Council. However, this time China may agree to take up the issue because it must be aware of the seriousness of the situation and because of its position as the chair of the six-party nuclear talks. But Beijing's support for sanctions appears unlikely. Among the participant countries in the talks, China, Russia and South Korea have advocated a softer approach to Pyongyang, while the US and Japan have taken a harder line. China and Russia appear unlikely to agree to economic sanctions against Pyongyang. Because of this prospect, Japan and the US have been poised to cooperate in imposing economic sanctions of their own, even without a UN resolution. Japan has already passed the necessary bills to do so on its own. In 2004, Japan revised the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law to allow the government to halt trade and block cash remittances to North Korea - or to any other country, without a UN resolution. Japan also enacted a law that year that authorizes the government to ban the docking of North Korean ships, or ships that have visited North Korea, at Japanese ports. The Mangyongbyon-92 ferry had been widely considered to be among the most likely targets. Pyongyang has often warned that economic sanctions would be tantamount to a "declaration of war". To be sure, North Korea would suffer if Japan went that far. But the impact of the Japanese punishment would be limited unless other nations, especially China and South Korea, join in the sanctions. Until 2002, Japan was North Korea's second-largest trading partner after China, facilitated in part by the large ethnic-Korean community in Japan. However, the two-way trade has shrunk considerably in recent years, reflecting increasingly tense relations. Japan has fallen behind China, South Korea and Thailand. Japan now appears very likely to accelerate work on implementing recently enhanced security arrangements with the US and bilateral cooperation on a missile defense system. In April 1996, then prime minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and then US president Bill Clinton issued a joint security declaration in Tokyo reaffirming the importance of the bilateral security alliance in the post-Cold War era. The next year, Japan and the US adopted new defense cooperation guidelines to flesh out the declaration. Beginning in May 1999, Japan set about enacting laws needed to put these agreements into effect. The government initially faced opposition the Diet (Japan's parliament). But the increased sense of crisis among many Japanese over threats posed by North Korea smoothed the way for passage, helped by provocations from Pyongyang. Heading the list of provocations was the multi-stage Taepodong-1 missile the North sent without warning over Japan into the northern Pacific in August 1998. Also, two North Korean spy ships were spotted in March 1999 in Japanese territorial waters off the Noto Peninsula, central Japan. In December 2001, a North Korean spy ship blew itself up and sank after a fire fight with Japan Coast Guard patrol boats in waters off the Amami Islands, Kagoshima prefecture. North Korea's 1998 Taepodong-1 missile launch also spurred Tokyo to begin joint technological research with Washington on a missile defense system the following year. In December last year, the Koizumi government formally committed to the joint development of a new sea-based interceptor missile, called the Standard Missile-3 (SM3), as a main pillar of the US-led system. The joint development cost is estimated at a maximum of $2.7 billion, with Japan shouldering up to $1.2 billion and the US paying the rest. Japan also decided in late 2003 to introduce a defensive system, using existing interceptor missiles, by 2007. Well over 100 Patriot Advanced Capability 3, or PAC3, surface-to-air missiles will be procured by the end of fiscal 2010. PAC3 missiles are intended to hit incoming missiles at an altitude of up to 20 kilometers that have escaped missiles launched from Japanese destroyers. In July last year, Japan revised the Self-Defense Forces law to allow the Defense Agency chief to order emergency missile interceptions without waiting for approval from the prime minister and the cabinet. Since North Korean missiles would reach Japanese territory in about 10 minutes, the defense chief could not afford to follow normal procedures. On June 23, Japan and the US signed an agreement to formally begin the joint development of an advanced SM3. And recently, the Bush administration reportedly notified Tokyo that it would deploy PAC3 missiles at a base in Okinawa by year's end. The deployment will be the first time the surface-to-air missiles have been installed to defend US forces in Japan from possible North Korean missile attacks. On June 22, a US Navy ship intercepted a medium-range missile warhead above the earth's atmosphere off Hawaii in the latest test of the US missile defense program. The US said the test had been scheduled for months and was not prompted by indications that North Korea was planning to test launch a long-range missile. The Japanese destroyer Kirishima practiced tracking the target, marking the first time that a Japanese Aegis destroyer had participated in a US interception test. Hisane Masaki is a Tokyo-based journalist, commentator and scholar on international politics and economy. Masaki's e-mail address is yiu45535@nifty.com. (Copyright 2006 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing .)
Analyse
Une diplomatie au bord du gouffre, par Philippe Pons
LE MONDE 05.07.06 13h26 • Mis à jour le 05.07.06 13h26
arement Pyongyang aura été aussi loin dans la gesticulation militaire. Considéré comme un acte de provocation par les Etats-Unis et le Japon, le "feu d'artifice" de missiles auquel vient de se livrer le régime ne peut que mettre davantage la République populaire démocratique de Corée (RPDC) à l'index de la communauté internationale et entraîner de la part de Tokyo et de Washington un renforcement des sanctions économiques à son égard.
Geste désespéré d'un régime aux abois ? Pari risqué pour tenter de rétablir un rapport de forces à son avantage ? Jusqu'à présent, le régime de Pyongyang a démontré qu'il est moins imprévisible qu'on le dit et qu'il joue relativement habilement le peu de cartes qu'il a en main, au fil d'une "diplomatie au bord du gouffre" dont les tirs de missiles sont une nouvelle expression.
Du point de vue nord-coréen, l'accord nucléaire passé par les Etats-Unis avec l'Inde et les négociations en cours avec l'Iran - qui a un programme nucléaire moins avancé que celui de la Corée du Nord - témoignent du peu de cas qui est fait à Washington de la position de la RPDC. Les pourparlers à six (deux Corées, Chine, Etats-Unis, Japon et Russie) sont dans l'impasse depuis la signature de l'accord du 19 septembre 2005. Profitant de la généralité des termes de cet accord-cadre, Pyongyang a précisé ses exigences que Washington rejette.
Mais le régime refuse surtout de revenir à la table de négociation tant que les Etats-Unis n'auront pas levé les sanctions (gel de ses avoirs à l'étranger et blocage partiel de ses flux financiers internationaux), prises pratiquement au moment où cet accord était signé. Celles-ci visent à étrangler le régime sans avoir besoin d'obtenir un aval - improbable - du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies en raison de l'opposition de la Chine et de la Russie à des sanctions. Le Japon soutient la position américaine et, en 2005, ses échanges avec la RPDC ont diminué de moitié.
Pyongyang peut penser que le moment est opportun pour ouvrir un nouveau front, ou du moins créer une diversion alors que Washington est empêtré dans le conflit irakien et condamné à patienter dans son bras de fer avec Téhéran. Ce que voient les Coréens du Nord, c'est que "finalement, l'administration Bush est contrainte à négocier avec les "méchants" : Iraniens, insurgés irakiens", souligne Robert Dujarric, chercheur associé à l'Institut japonais pour les affaires étrangères. "Le seul risque que prend le régime est la réaction de la Chine : jusqu'où tolérera-t-elle ses provocations ?", poursuit-il.
Condamnée par la Russie, la gesticulation de Pyongyang embarrasse Pékin, mais aussi Séoul où elle donne des arguments aux adversaires de la politique conciliante du président Roh Moo-hyun. Elle va surtout renforcer l'alliance militaire américano-japonaise dans le domaine du bouclier anti-missile qui doit être mise en place fin 2006 ou début 2007. Même en matière de renseignement, le Japon dépend largement des satellites américains. Bien que la crise ait pour théâtre l'Asie du Nord-Est, l'archipel est largement impuissant pour la désamorcer, d'autant moins que ses relations avec Pékin et Séoul sont des plus froides, et que l'opinion publique est remontée contre le régime de Pyongyang depuis l'affaire des kidnappés japonais par des agents du Nord dans les années 1970-1980, dont le dénouement n'est pas en vue. Le Japon, qui se sent directement menacé par les menées jugées bellicistes de la Corée du Nord, est partisan de la plus grande fermeté vis-à-vis de Pyongyang.
Aux Etats-Unis, l'impatience commence à gagner du terrain et des voix mêmes modérées - telles que celle de l'ancien secrétaire à la défense William Perry, qui préconisa en 1999 un plus grand engagement de l'administration Clinton vis-à-vis de la RPDC - s'élèvent pour suggérer une action préventive contre les bases de missiles de Corée du Nord, l'option militaire semble écartée pour des raisons géopolitiques (proximité de la Chine et de la Corée du Sud, qui s'y opposent). En outre, la détérioration de la situation en Irak ne plaide guère en faveur d'une telle initiative, compte tenu des risques de conflit qu'elle pourrait entraîner alors que les forces américaines y sont lourdement engagées, ainsi qu'en Afghanistan.
L'évolution de la crise sur le nucléaire iranien pourrait être un autre élément qui a poussé Pyongyang à se "manifester". Comme la RPDC, l'Iran refuse de se plier aux exigences de la communauté internationale en matière de non-prolifération nucléaire, et continue à affirmer son droit à enrichir de l'uranium. Mais elle vient de se voir proposer par les grandes puissances une série de mesures incitatives à la suspension de son programme qui rappellent étrangement l'accord de 1994 entre les Etats-Unis et la RPDC (fourniture de deux centrales à eau légère, dont l'énergie est plus difficile à détourner à des fins militaires, en échange du gel du programme nucléaire à base de plutonium). Cet accord a été considéré comme caduc par l'administration Bush à la suite des accusations qu'elle a portées en octobre 2002 à l'encontre de la RPDC, selon lesquelles celle-ci poursuivait un programme clandestin d'enrichissement de l'uranium. Accusations qui, à l'exception de l'acquisition par Pyongyang de centrifugeuses au Pakistan, n'ont jamais été étayées de preuves par Washington. L'Iran a annoncé qu'il répondra en août à la proposition qui lui a été faite le 6 juin et, apparemment, Pyongyang entend rappeler avant cette échéance que, dans son cas, l'impasse n'est pas uniquement son fait.
Une impasse qui pousse des démocrates mais aussi des républicains américains à encourager le président George Bush à changer de tactique à l'égard de la Corée du Nord. L'attentisme, assorti de sanctions et de moulinets qu'elle poursuit en refusant tout dialogue direct avec Pyongyang, ne semble guère efficace : depuis 2003, la RPDC est sortie du traité de non-prolifération (TNP), a repris sa production de plutonium, a annoncé en février 2005 s'être dotée de l'arme nucléaire - sans toutefois avoir procédé à un essai -, et elle vient de démontrer ses capacités en matière de missiles.
Après avoir fait de la Corée du Nord un "Etat voyou" et l'avoir inscrit en compagnie de l'Iran et de l'Irak de Saddam Hussein dans l'"axe du Mal", Washington semble aujourd'hui minimiser la menace qu'elle représente. "Les tirs de missiles sont une provocation, mais non une menace", a déclaré Steve Hadley, le conseiller présidentiel américain pour la sécurité nationale.
Une retenue qui pourrait indiquer un certain embarras.
Philippe Pons
Article paru dans l'édition du 06.07.06
Ja vàreu comentar l'altre dia aquest ARI de El Cano que parla sobre l'estratègia de seguretat nacional:
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/997.asp
Hi ha molts elements importants en aquest article, especialment la consideració de la nova doctrina Bush com a, ja no realista, sinó neorealista. Amb tot, en l'apartat final, crec que confon una mica l'idealisme, el realisme, neoconservadurisme i neorealisme.
Certament, els EUA, com els neorealistes, creuen que el poder no és una fita en si mateix sinó un mitjà, i per això explica que la nnova preocupació dels estats no és tant el poder sinó la seguretat. Però com us deia en anteriors missatges, crec que del que s'ha de parlar no és tant de neorealisme (que l'entenc més com un paradigma que corregeixes les mancances científiques dels realistes clàssics) sinó de realisme democràtic (democratic realism), que entenia l'expansió selectiva de la democràcia com a mitjà d'aconseguir "global safety and security".
Bé, seguirem parlant de neorealistes, neocons i realistes democràtics,...
Hi again,
I put an interesting article on American foreign policy’s unilateralism, specially on China. The basic hypothesis is American foreign policy did not with the Bush Administration, but it has its roots even with the Clinton Administration. The Clinton Doctrine point out that in order to maintain the stability in core regions of US interest (chiefly Europe and Japan) the instability in periphery regions should be combated. And the questions is: should USA act preemptively with China before it gets too powerful and threatens USA interest?
Krauthammer –I enjoy reading this neo-con so much!- put it clear: “The essence of foreign policy is deciding witch son of a bitch to support and which to oppose?”
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HG01Ad01.html
For more than a decade, the country's population has steadily shrunk from 150 million in the early 1990s to just more than 140 million today. According to official statistics, unless the situation changes, the Russian population will drop to 80 million by 2050, leaving the country's Far East virtually vacant.'
However, particularly the remote far eastern regions are being abandoned in what seems to be a flow of migration towards the west which obviously is set to have important consequences should the trend not be reversed.
'Russian officials concede that the country's Far East risks becoming a no man's land. The population in the area has declined by 20 per cent in the last 15 years, despite a revival of the regional economy, Kamil Iskhakov, the presidential envoy to the Far East said on in mid-May. "People are leaving because they can not find acceptable living conditions," he told an 18 May meeting in Khabarovsk.
Improving the demographic situation is a "matter of survival" for the Koryak Autonomous District, said governor Oleg Kozhemyako. The region still faces high mortality rates and significant population outflows, he conceded on 10 May.'
And this should be seen in the light of a especially well endowed territory which, at least at a first glance, bodes well for opportunities.
'The Russian Far East comprises 13 regions, stretches over 40 per cent of Russia's territory, and is home to vast natural resources, including virtually all of the country's diamonds, two-thirds of its gold deposits, and major timber and fishery resources.
Yet despite these opportunities, in recent years many Russians have been moving back to the European part of the country from the remote regions of Siberia and the Far East. As such, Russia's expansionist trend of the past several centuries is being reversed, leaving hardly populated stretches in the Asian part of the country.'
As the article also reports, Kremlin is hard at work to reverse the demographics trends in Russia and specifically the Eastern regions, will Moscow come through?
by democracy mattersIt's a bit longe, but interesting to (re)discover how Japan can do business with Vietnam,..
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/HF15Dh01.html
Japan Inc smitten by Vietnam
By Hisane Masaki TOKYO
- After a lengthy investment spree in China, many of corporate Japan's biggest names are making inroads in one of the world's few remaining communist states: Vietnam. Since last year, Vietnam has seen a spate of big investment projects by prominent Japanese firms such as Yamaha Motor Co and Mabuchi Motor Co, which invested US$48 million and $40 million, respectively. Nippon Sheet Glass Co's $145 million joint-venture factory with a local firm is also under construction, as is work on Canon Inc's new $70 million printer factory. Honda Motor Co has also announced that it will pour $60 million into a local auto factory within the next five years. Small and medium-sized Japanese firms are also flocking to Vietnam. According to some analysts, in 2000, Vietnam ranked eighth among destinations for Japanese investment. However, in 2005, Vietnam was in fourth place, just behind China, India and Thailand. For Japan's small and medium-sized enterprises in particular, Vietnam was the second option, just after China. In 2005, Japan invested about $400 million in a record high of 97 new FDI (foreign direct investment) projects in Vietnam on an approval basis. In terms of the value of investments made that year, Japan was the third-biggest foreign investor in Vietnam after South Korea and Hong Kong. In fact, it is possible that Japan was the biggest foreign investor in Vietnam last year, because some of the investments registered as originating in Hong Kong are believed to have actually been made by Japanese-funded firms there. Furthermore, Japan is seen by Vietnam as its most effective foreign investor in terms of the percentage of promised investments that actually materialize. Japan made $6.2 billion worth of investments in Vietnam between 1988 and 2005 on an approval basis. Of that amount, about 74%, or $4.5 billion, was actually realized - by far the highest realization rate among foreign countries and regions investing in Vietnam. Going by realized investment amount only for the 1988-2005 period, Japan was the biggest foreign investor in Vietnam. The current boom of Japanese and other foreign investment in Vietnam is the second. The first one occurred in the mid-1990s after the lifting of US economic sanctions against the Southeast Asian country in 1994 and the establishment of full diplomatic ties between Washington and Hanoi the following year. Japan's annual FDI in Vietnam peaked at $1.13 billion in 1995. 'China plus one'The comparison of China to Vietnam is instructive. China is gobbling up about $60 billion worth of FDI annually, the largest amount of any developing country. In addition to being a lucrative market with the world's biggest population of about 1.3 billion, China has increasingly become the world's manufacturing center. The rapidly ascending global economic power superseded Japan as the world's third-largest trading nation after the US and Germany in 2004. With its exports booming, China's overall trade surplus surpassed $100 billion last year, causing friction with major trading partners such the US and Europe, although well over half of Chinese exports are produced by foreign-funded companies. China remains by far the most powerful magnet for Japanese and other foreign investors in Asia. Vietnam's total FDI currently is roughly a tenth of China's, at about $6 billion annually. Vietnam's economic size and population also pale before China's. But the Southeast Asian nation has cheaper labor. Its per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is still about $480, less than half China's, which has already exceeded $1,000. Vietnam has become an increasingly popular investment destination for Japanese firms seeking to reduce their excessive dependence on China and spread their business risks in Asia more evenly. According to a survey conducted early this year by the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), Vietnam has become the first choice for those Japanese firms that are operating in China and want to shift their investment to a third country. Lying behind what some people describe as the "China plus one" attitude among Japanese investors are concerns about the risks involved in doing business in China. These concerns were fed by Beijing's slow response to the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), and also by the anti-Japanese riots that swept through China in April 2005. More important is the currency factor, since a stronger Chinese yuan weakens the advantage exporters derive from operating in China. In the face of strong international pressure, especially from the United States, China revalued the yuan against the US dollar last July, albeit by a meager percentage. A further rise in the value of the yuan is anticipated in the medium and long terms. Also, labor costs are on the rise and shortages of power and water supplies have emerged as headaches for foreign firms with operations in China as well as for their local counterparts. With its relatively large population of about 82 million, Vietnam also has decent potential as a lucrative market in its own right. But for now, most Japanese manufacturing businesses are looking to Vietnam as a production base for exports, primarily to the rest of Asia, including Japan itself. Tailwinds for VietnamThis year marks the 20th anniversary of Vietnam's doi moi policy of free-market reforms and external opening. Vietnam was not immune to the fallout from the Asian financial crisis that first erupted in Thailand in the summer of 1997 and quickly swept through the region. Because of a sharp decline in foreign investment from its neighbors and a slump in exports to them, Vietnam's economic growth slowed to 5.8% in 1998 and 4.9% in 1999, after posting growth of between 8% and 9% for the preceding several years. But the slowdown is now a thing of the past, with the Vietnamese economy fully recovered and on a solid growth track. In fact, Vietnam has been one of Asia's fastest-growing economies in recent years. The Asian Development Bank predicts that the country's economy, buoyed by brisk foreign investment and firm domestic demand, will grow 7.8% this year and 8% next year. Tailwinds are blowing for Vietnam - and for Japanese and other foreign investors there. Japanese firms' investment spree in Vietnam comes amid an increasing number of free-trade agreements (FTAs) being concluded or negotiated in East Asia. Until several years ago, the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) was the only such trade arrangement in East Asia, but one after another FTA has since popped up in the region. To take advantage of the FTAs, Japanese manufacturers in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations member states are stepping up the realignment of their production networks in the region by moving production bases from one ASEAN country to another, as well as from China to ASEAN. The investment pact between Japan and Vietnam took effect in late 2004. Japan and Vietnam are also to open FTA negotiations late this year; Japan is separately negotiating an FTA with the ASEAN as a whole. In another significant recent development, Vietnam and the US signed a trade pact at the end of May, paving the way for Hanoi to realize its long-cherished goal of becoming a member of the World Trade Organization late this year. WTO membership, which obliges Vietnam to open its markets wider to foreign competition and make its trade and investment rules and regulations fully compatible with international norms, is expected to fuel Japanese and other foreign investment further in the country. China gained WTO membership almost simultaneously with its hosting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in late 2001. Although it may be just a coincidence, Vietnam will host this year's summit of leaders from 21 APEC member economies in November, further highlighting its higher profile in the regional economic arena. US President George W Bush is expected to attend the political extravaganza. Pump-priming effectsIn 1992, a year after the warring factions in Cambodia signed a peace agreement in Paris to end years of deadly civil war, Japan became the first major industrialized country to resume full-scale economic aid for Vietnam. Japan has been Vietnam's top aid donor since 1995. Japanese official development assistance (ODA) for Vietnam totals nearly 100 billion yen ($869.5 million) annually. Vietnam is now one of the largest recipients of Japanese ODA money. Vietnam is also a potential important supplier of oil and natural gas for energy-resource-poor Japan. Vietnam is the second-largest after Indonesia among the ASEAN members in terms of population and also has geopolitical importance because it borders China. Vietnam joined ASEAN in 1995, followed by Laos and Myanmar in 1997 and then Cambodia in 1999. The four countries on the Indochina peninsula are the least developed of the 10 ASEAN members. For ASEAN, correcting the so-called "ASEAN divide" - the huge gap in wealth between rich and poor members - is a high priority as the grouping accelerates its economic integration with an ultimate goal of creating a fully integrated "ASEAN Economic Community" by 2020. For countries outside ASEAN, such as Japan and China, assistance in the development of the poorer ASEAN nations is becoming a very important avenue to strengthened ties with ASEAN as a whole - and greater political clout in the region. The bulk of Japanese ODA money for Vietnam has been provided in the form of soft loans to finance infrastructure projects, and the rest in the form of grants-in-aid and technical cooperation. Japan has also implemented a "comprehensive policy-assistance project" as part of its technical cooperation for Vietnam, which is aimed at helping Vietnam switch to a free-market economy from communist-style central planning by means of a joint study on Hanoi's economic development policies by experts from both sides. It marked the first full-scale "intellectual assistance" project to be implemented by Japan for a developing country as part of its ODA. Early this year, the two countries extended the two-year joint action program launched by their leaders in 2003 to improve Vietnam's business environment, strengthen its economic competitiveness and accelerate the inflow of FDI. At a workshop held in March to review the joint initiative, Hanoi officials highly valued the joint program, saying it had enhanced FDI in Vietnam. This program, along with the 2004 investment pact, has contributed to increased Japanese confidence in Vietnam and thereby to a sharp surge in Japanese investment there. Of course, there remain many negatives associated with operating in Vietnam. Existing and potential foreign investors have criticized the country for its poor infrastructure, excessive bureaucracy, a dearth of skilled workers, underdeveloped support industries and widespread corruption. In a recent seminar on Vietnam investment held in Tokyo, Vietnamese Planning and Investment Minister Vo Hong Phuc pledged to improve his country's investment climate constantly to attract more foreign investment, particularly from Japan. Attractive manufacturing baseThe Japanese firms doing business in Vietnam include such giants as Toyota Motor, Sony, Canon and Honda. Many Japanese firms have made forays into Vietnam or have boosted investment there in recent months. In one of the highest-profile Japanese investments lately, Canon began construction of its second inkjet-printer factory in Vietnam, at Tien Son Industrial Zone in the northern province of Bac Ninh. The factory, with an investment capital of $70 million, is to come online next April. It will turn out 700,000 printers per month, all of which will be exported. Canon plans to funnel an additional investment of $40 million into the factory. Canon's first inkjet-printer factory in the country is in Hanoi's Thang Long Industrial Zone. The group also owns a laser-printer plant in Bac Ninh province's Que Vo Industrial Zone that became operational last year. Among other investments by big Japanese firms, Nippon Sheet Glass Co's $145 million joint-venture sheet-glass factory with a local firm, now under construction in the southern province of Ba Ria-Vung Tau, will go online this autumn. Honda Vietnam (HVN) recently announced plans to pour $60 million into an auto factory within the next five years. Over the past 10 years, HVN has invested nearly $194 million in the production of motorbikes of various models and has been a pioneer of the motorbike-manufacturing sector in Vietnam. Suzuki Motor's new $20 million motorcycle plant opened early this year in the southern province of Dong Nai. Among smaller firms, Nidec Corp started production at its new fan-motor factory in Saigon High-Tech Park on June 1. The factory is run by Nidec's newly established, wholly owned subsidiary with a paid-in capital of $11 million. Kokuyo Co plans to establish a plant at the Nomura-Haiphong industrial complex in the northern city of Haiphong in August to produce, for the time being, stationery and paper products for exports to Japan. Tokyo Seiko Co is building a $90 million factory in the Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park in the southern province of Binh Duong to manufacture steel-wire cable. A $3 million printing-ink factory of Dainipon Ink and Chemicals Inc went on stream at the same industrial park in March. Mitsuwa Electric Industry Co is constructing a plant at Que Vo Industrial Zone in the northern province of Bac Ninh to produce plastic products and paint. That plant is expected to be put into operation in October. Sumitomo Electric Industries Ltd (SEI) was licensed recently to establish a company to produce electric wire for cars in the northern province of Hai Duong. Sumiden Vietnam Automotive Wire, which will have an investment capital of $100 million, is SEI's 11th automotive-wire company overseas. SEI has set a target of making Vietnam the largest automotive-wire producer in Southeast Asia. Kaneka Group began construction of a $2 million high-grade medical-equipment factory at Binh Duong's Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park recently. Garment manufacturer UNIQLO Co reportedly will reduce its production in China to less than 70% of the total, from more than 90% currently, by 2009. UNIQLO reportedly will boost the percentage of Southeast Asian output to more than 30% by starting production in Vietnam and Cambodia. Pentax Corp will establish a new plant in Hanoi by October to boost production of camera lenses. Terumo Corp recently announced plans to build a medical-equipment production plant in Vietnam at a cost of about $24 million. That plant, the firm's fourth outside Japan, is to be put into operation around the middle of fiscal 2007. Yokohama Rubber Co plans to put into operation a new $9 million tire plant for trucks and two-wheeled vehicles in Vietnam next June. Nakashima Propeller Co plans to open its first overseas production base in Vietnam next February. Its wholly owned subsidiary to run the $6 million propeller factory in Haiphong was set up recently. Yakult Honsha Co announced recently that it will set up a joint venture in the southern province of Binh Duong with Danone Group of France to produce and sell lactic-acid-bacteria beverages (previously, Yakult products, being imported, have been very expensive in Vietnam). Danone Group is the biggest shareholder of Yakult, with a 20% stake. The joint venture in Vietnam will be the two firms' second overseas after one in India. EXEDY Corp will set up a joint venture firm with a Taiwanese maker in Vietnam to produce and sell clutches for two-wheeled vehicles. The joint venture will build a $1.1 million assembly line in Hanoi. And jewelry seller Sadamatsu Co announced recently that it will build its first factory - both at home and abroad - in Vietnam at a cost of between 10 million and 20 million yen primarily to manufacture rings. High-tech industry links burgeoningEarly this year, computer-chip leader Intel Corp announced it would build a $300 million factory at Saigon High-Tech Park. The plant, now under construction, will initially employ 1,200 people. It is believed to be the biggest investment yet by a US company in Vietnam. Microsoft chairman Bill Gates visited Vietnam in April. After meeting the country's top leaders, Gates received a star's welcome at the Hanoi University of Technology from about 7,000 students. Gates' visit came less than a year after he signed agreements to provide training for computer-technology teachers and support Vietnam's technology sector. These highly publicized developments involving the two US high-tech giants have raised Vietnam's profile as a promising high-tech business location. Meanwhile, Vietnam is rapidly emerging as one of the top choices for Japanese information-technology (IT) businesses in software outsourcing, after India and China, some experts say. At present, there are some 600 software-related firms in Vietnam, mostly in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. The Vietnam Software Association forecasts Vietnam's export of software products to Japan could reach about $350 million by 2010. To attain that figure, the country needs more than 14,500 IT engineers, they say. In June 2004, the governments of Japan and Vietnam signed an IT-cooperation agreement for Tokyo to help organize IT training courses conducted in Japanese at Vietnamese universities and enterprises and also to provide experts and equipment to Vietnam. Among other cooperation projects between Japan and Vietnam, the first Vietnam-Japan joint training project allowing Vietnamese IT engineers to work with Japanese partners became operational at Ho Chi Minh City-based Quang Trung Software Park last autumn. The UK Brain IT Engineer Training Co is a $1.2 million joint venture between Japan's Unico Technos and Vietnam's Kobe Co. It was established with the aim of developing a Vietnam-Japan IT training center, as a bridge for exchanging IT engineers between the two countries. FPT Software, Vietnam's largest system integration vendor with about 900 engineers, plans to open a vocational school for IT engineers in September with the support of Tokyo's Keio University and a similar Japanese vocational school. Nihon Unisys set up an offshore software-development firm in Hanoi on June 1. The wholly owned subsidiary USOL Vietnam Corp is capitalized at $100,000. The firm gets full support from FPT Software, which sends engineers on loan, among other things. NEC Soft and Singapore-based NEC Solutions Asia Pacific Pte (NECSAP) also established a joint-venture firm in Hanoi recently to promote their software-development and system-integration business in Vietnam. NEC Solutions Vietnam Co, capitalized at $1 million, began operation on June 1. Fujitsu's Vietnamese subsidiary also plans to increase its staff. Cybozu, a leading Japanese groupware firm, also started software development in Vietnam on June 1 in collaboration with another Japanese firm, CS Systems Co. The development is being made at the local subsidiary of CS Systems in Ho Chi Minh City. The flow of investment in the IT sector is not always one-way. FPT Software set up its wholly owned Japanese subsidiary, FPT Software Japan, in November to land software outsourcing deals with new Japanese customers. Among major Japanese customers FPT Software has dealt with since setting up the Japanese subsidiary are IT vendors TIS Inc and Hitachi Software Engineering Co and mail-order firm Nissen Co. Banks as go-betweensJapanese banks are ready to cash in on booming Japanese investments in Vietnam. Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ signed a cooperation agreement with the Vietnamese Ministry of Planning and Investment in February to promote Japanese investments in Vietnam. Under the agreement, the leading Japanese bank will hold periodic conferences on investment procedures in Vietnam for Japanese investors. For its part, Vietnam has agreed to inform the bank of amendments to investment regulations and Japanese businesses' operations in Vietnam. More recently, another major Japanese bank, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp, signed a similar agreement late last month to promote a better understanding of policies and laws in Vietnam by holding seminars and organizing investment missions for Japanese companies that are keen to expand into Vietnamese markets. The Tokyo metropolitan government has teamed up with Japan's three biggest financial groups - Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Mizuho Financial Group and Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group - and about 10 public organizations to provide paid advisory services to local small and medium-size firms keen on making inroads into foreign markets. The services, to be launched as early as late June, will advise such firms on market conditions and legal systems, mainly in Asian countries, utilizing information networks of the three financial groups. For the project's first year, the metropolitan government has selected Vietnam as its main target country. Among the approximately 10 public organizations participating in the project are JETRO and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation. Meanwhile, Dai-ichi Mutual Life Insurance Co officially launched its representative office in Hanoi early this year, becoming the first Japanese life-insurance company to operate in Vietnam. NIPPONKOA Insurance Co recently forged a business alliance with Bao Viet, Vietnam's biggest insurer. Under the tie-up, Bao Viet will sell insurance products to NIPPONKOA's customer firms with operations in Vietnam, where foreign insurers are still allowed only a limited market access. Hisane Masaki is a Tokyo-based journalist, commentator and scholar on international politics and economics. His e-mail address is yiu45535@nifty.com. (Copyright 2006 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing .)
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/HF21Dh01.html
Japan's face-saving exit from Iraq
By Hisane Masaki TOKYO -
After several twists and turns, Japan finally made a long-awaited announcement on Tuesday that it will withdraw its troops from Iraq, a decision that will allow the nation to play on its own ground in post-war Iraq: economic cooperation. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi announced that some 600 Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) troops stationed in the southern Iraqi city of Samawah would return home. "After closely consulting with the United States, the multinational forces, Britain and Australia, I made the decision because I judged that the humanitarian mission has completed a certain achievement in the region," Koizumi told a news conference. British forces currently oversee a multinational contingent in Muthanna, which includes Japanese and Australian troops. It will be the first of the Iraqi provinces, outside the relatively peaceful north, to come under full Iraqi control. The transfer of security authority has been the major factor behind Tokyo's decision on the timing of the GSDF pullout. On Monday, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki said that Iraqi forces would take over security in the southern province of Muthanna, of which Samawah is the capital, next month. Tuesday's decision, formalized at the day's security council chaired by Koizumi, will end Japan's first - and most dangerous - troop deployment since World War II to a country where fighting is still ongoing. The GSDF troops will retreat to Kuwait - where the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) unit is stationed - within a month or so before stepping on Japanese soil again. Koizumi and US President George W Bush, who both took office in early 2001, have forged a close personal relationship. Koizumi has been one of the staunchest supporters of the Bush administration's "war on terror" as well as the Iraq war. The Koizumi government enacted two new controversial laws to enable the SDF to assist US-led military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Under the first law, enacted in October 2001, only several weeks after the September 11 terrorist attacks in the US, SDF naval vessels were dispatched to the Indian Ocean to help with fuel supplies to coalition warships in the US-led operation in Afghanistan. By international standards, even refueling such ships effectively means exercising the right to collective self-defense, an act successive Japanese governments have interpreted as violating the post-World War II, pacifist constitution, which bans the use or threat of force as a means of settling international disputes. Under the second law, enacted in August 2003, the Koizumi government dispatched non-combat GSDF troops to Iraq in early 2004. The SDF troops have been deployed in Samawah on a humanitarian and reconstruction mission, such as medical assistance, water purification and repair of roads, schools and other infrastructure. Although Japan wanted to withdraw earlier, it could not do so because it feared hurting relations with the US by becoming the first among the close US allies in the Iraq war to exit. Japan's earlier plan to begin a troop withdrawal in March - which received informal approval from the US, Britain and Australia - was botched because of the delay in the formation of a new Iraqi government following mid-December parliamentary elections and a resurgence in insurgent and sectarian violence across Iraq. Significant developments came on June 8, when Maliki announced that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, was killed in a US air strike. Zarqawi was accused of advocating and participating in the kidnappings and beheadings of foreign workers. His group claimed responsibility for the kidnapping and beheading of Japanese backpacker, 24-year-old Shosei Koda in October 2004. Shortly after the Zarqawi announcement, the Iraqi parliament approved Maliki's nominees for the key posts of defense and interior ministers, which had remained unfilled despite the formation of a new coalition government on May 20. For Japan, the British and Australian plans to withdraw their forces from the southern province of Muthanna provided a convenient cover as non-combat Japanese troops are protected by British and Australian forces. To be sure, Japan's deployment of troops in Iraq marked a turning point in the nation's security policy and significantly solidified the alliance with the US. But while Koizumi has enjoyed remarkably high popularity, the troop deployment has proved quite unpopular among the Japanese public. Koizumi-Bush meetingNo Japanese troops have been killed in Iraq. Even the killing of a single Japanese soldier would have dealt a severe blow to the Koizumi government. Many analyst say Koizumi has been lucky on this point. Koizumi has been widely believed to have a strong desire to see the GSDF troops return home before he steps down in September, when his current term as president of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) - and hence as premier - expires. Koizumi, as premier, will make his last visit to the US at the end of this month. In an apparent quid pro quo for the withdrawal of GSDF troops, Koizumi is expected to tell Bush that Japan will meet the US request for the ASDF's logistic support activities around Iraq. The ASDF unit, now stationed in Kuwait, will continue with its mission. Three C-130 cargo planes are currently involved in transporting multinational forces' personnel and materials mainly between Kuwait and Taril Airport in southern Iraq. The security council decided on Tuesday to expand the airplanes' activities to include Baghdad and the northern Iraqi city of Arbi. This is something Japan has refused to do previously on the ground that it is too dangerous. Koizumi and Bush are expected to reaffirm the solid security alliance between their countries, despite the Japanese troop pullout hiccup. They are expected to agree on the importance of implementing a final agreement their foreign and defense ministers announced in early May on the realignment of nearly 50,000 American forces and bases in Japan. The realignment, which is part of the US's global "transformation" of its military and includes the transfer of 8,000 US marines from the southernmost Japanese island prefecture of Okinawa to Guam in the Pacific, will further cement the bonds between the allies through increased integration of their military operations. It will also pave the way for Tokyo's greater involvement in US-led operations not only in Asia, but globally. North Korea will also very likely top the agenda at the Koizumi-Bush meeting, as the Stalinist state is reportedly preparing to test-fire its long-range missile, Taepodong 2, which is reportedly capable of hitting the US West Coast. Iran's nuclear development program will also be high on the agenda. In his talks with Bush, Koizumi is also expected to express Japan's firm determination to play a leading role in Iraqi reconstruction. On Monday, Koizumi said that Japan would continue to provide reconstruction and humanitarian aid to the Iraqi people even after the troops were pulled out. Foreign Minister Taro Aso also said, "Japan needs to continue its commitment to assist efforts of the Iraqi government and its people toward nation-building while cooperating with the international community." Meanwhile, in Baghdad, Japanese Ambassador Hisao Yamaguchi met with the Iraqi prime minister and vowed that Japan would continue to actively support Iraqi reconstruction efforts, mainly through its official development assistance. Japan has taken a high profile in Iraqi reconstruction. In fact, Japan has pledged $5 billion in aid - $1.5 billion in grants-in-aid and $3.5 billion in soft loans - for post-war Iraq, the largest amount committed by any single nation, except the US. The $1.5 billion portion has already been disbursed. According to the US State Department, as of the end of March, of the $13.5 billion total pledged by nations other than the US at an aid conference for Iraq in 2003, only $3.5 billion had been disbursed. This slow pace of disbursements has frustrated the US. In March, Japan lifted a freeze on soft loans imposed since 1985 and decided to provide about 76.5 billion yen (US$665 million) in soft loans to Iraq. Of this amount, 30.2 billion yen will be used for the rehabilitation of Port Umm-Qasr, the most important port of Iraq; 36.7 billion yen for the rehabilitation of al-Mussaib thermal power plants in the suburbs of Baghdad; and 9.5 billion yen for an irrigation project aimed at improving agricultural production and increasing employment. In an apparent bid to demonstrate its firm resolve to assist Iraqi reconstruction, Japan announced on Monday that it would extend an additional soft loan worth about 3.3 billion yen as part of the $5 billion aid package pledged in 2003. This loan will be used for construction of roads and bridges in Samawah. Hisane Masaki is a Tokyo-based journalist, commentator and scholar on international politics and economy. Masaki's e-mail address is yiu45535@nifty.com. (Copyright 2006 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
